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UNFETTER THE SHACKLE: PROMOTING SHAREHOLDER
INVOLVEMENT IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE THROUGH
PROXY MECHANISM
INTRODUCTION
From time to time, scholars argue that the role of corporate law is to
guarantee that shareholders have adequate information to participate
intelligently in the securities market, or to empower them to make changes to
the corporation’s internal structure.1 As an important mechanism to realize
these goals, proxy rules serve to ensure that the shareholders receive sufficient
information about corporate matters and are afforded the opportunity to act as
they wish on the matter.2
State statutes and case law provided the initial foundation for the
emergence of proxy rules. But state laws merely empowered proxy voting,
instead of regulating its mechanics, and case law rarely addressed problems of
shareholder access.3 As a gap-filler, a set of rules under Section 14 of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 has been playing a major role in constructing
the proxy mechanism.4 Federal proxy rules apply if a company has securities
listed on a national securities exchange, has a class of equity securities held by
500 or more shareholders, and total assets exceeding $10 million,5 or is a
registered investment company or a public utility holding company.6 Thus, this
essay limits the discussion to the proxy rules applicable to these types of
companies, most of which are not likely to be small. Since the ownership
interests in these “big” companies are scattered and discrete, more elaborate
proxy solicitation is required.7 However, there have always been focus points
among various proxy approaches, and the current legal system has made
certain choices when determining to what extent the proxy should be utilized
in the hands of shareholders. This essay will identify the commonly used
1 Dalia Tsuk Mitchell, Shareholders as Proxies: The Contours of Shareholder Democracy, 63 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 1503, 1509–10 (2006).
2 Executive Legal Summary 224, EXECLSUM 224 (database updated Dec 2015).
3 Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Access to the Corporate Proxy Machinery, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1489, 1492–93
(1970).
4 Id.
5 15 U.S.C § 78l(a)(g) (2011).
6 17 C.F.R. § 270.20a-1(a) (2009); 17 C.F.R. §§ 250.60–61 (2009).
7 Eisenberg, supra note 3, at 1491.
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approaches, analyze how shareholders can make use of these measures, and
discuss the factors that impact the development of important proxy
mechanisms toward a more pro-shareholder direction.
I. MODERN PROXY MECHANISM AND ITS TYPICAL FORM
The modern federal proxy rules start from the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 (“1934 Act”),8 and are imposed in detail by accompanying Securities and
Exchange Commission regulations.9 The term “proxy” refers to a document
that authorizes a designated person to vote the shareholder’s shares with
respect to the matters and in the manner specified in such document.10
Normally proxy solicitation takes place at least once a year for board elections
and other important corporate issues.11 In most cases, the existing directors
nominate the slate of candidates and the company sends information to the
shareholders through “proxy materials”—usually comprising a proxy voting
card and a proxy statement—so those shareholders have information to vote
their shares.12 As a result, the board of incumbent directors constantly takes
control of the proxy process, whereas individual shareholders have little say in
determining the election.13 Several reasons contribute to this imbalance. First,
the incumbent directors and management make proxy proposals and frequently
the only votes that count are the votes cast in favor of the names on the
proxy.14 Furthermore, companies often have a staggered board, which means
only one-third of board seats are up for election each year.15 Finally,
shareholders have to incur significant costs, but do not receive reimbursement

8 See 15 U.S.C. § 78n (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) (enabling the SEC to regulate the proxy solicitation
process by stipulating “It shall be unlawful for any person . . . , in contravention of such rules and regulations
as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of
investors . . . , to solicit any proxy or consent or authorization in respect of any security (other than an
exempted security) registered pursuant to section 78l of this title.”).
9 See generally Solicitation of Proxies, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a (2013).
10 Executive Legal Summary, supra note 2.
11 Id.
12 SEC Adopts New Measures to Facilitate Director Nominations by Shareholders, U.S. SEC. AND EXCH.
COMM’N (Aug. 25, 2010), https://www.sec.gov/news/press/2010/2010-155.htm; see also Bus. Roundtable v.
SEC, 647 F.3d 1144, 1147 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (“The proxy statement concerns voting procedures and
background information about the board’s nominee(s); the proxy card enables shareholders to vote for or
against the nominee(s) without attending the meeting”).
13 See Bernard S. Black, Agents Watching Agents: The Promise of Institutional Investor Voice, 39 UCLA
L. REV. 811, 825 (1992).
14 Mitchell, supra note 1, at 1507.
15 Id.
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from the corporation, while the board can charge its full expenses to the
company.16
Nonetheless, shareholders who desire to input their advice to the annual
meeting can achieve the goal by means of shareholder proposal. Rule 14a-8 of
the Securities Exchange Act provides that eligible shareholders are entitled, at
no cost to themselves, to include proposals in board’s proxy materials.17 But in
addition to the eligibility issue and certain procedural hurdles set forth by the
rule, shareholders may encounter the company’s, in essence the board’s,
refusal if the proposal’s subject matter falls within one of the listed grounds for
exclusion.18 Not surprisingly, director election is among the exclusionary
reasons and the relevant clause bars shareholders from intervening in the
election in any form, including putting a specific individual in the company’s
proxy materials for election to the board of directors.19 To exclude a
shareholder proposal, a company must submit a “no-action” request to the SEC
before it files definitive proxy materials.20
To introduce their nominees into the director election, many shareholders
would mount a “proxy fight” or “proxy contest.” Generally, proxy contests are
used to replace board members where a serious dispute exists about the current
management’s policies, competence, or integrity, and where sufficient
shareholder dissatisfaction provides reasonable grounds for a prospective
success in an electoral challenge against the incumbent board.21 To initiate a
proxy contest, a shareholder who wishes to nominate a candidate other than the
ones proposed by the incumbent board should separately file his own proxy
statement and solicit votes from other shareholders.22 Although proxy contests
may seem like an optimal measure to remove an unwanted director from the
board, this often requires significant funding and additional social resources.23
Typically, for an “insurgent” shareholder or shareholder group to succeed in a
proxy contest, the shareholders need to either hold sufficient shares that are
entitled to vote, or persuade enough other shareholders to vote for their
nominee, so that they have a better chance to obtain majority votes in the
16

Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth of the Shareholder Franchise, 93 VA. L. REV. 675, 690 (2007).
See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8.
18 See id. § 240.14a-8(i).
19 See id. § 240.14a-8(i)(8).
20 See id. § 240.14a-8(i)(9).
21 Corporate Acquisitions § 1:151, Westlaw (updated Dec. 2015).
22 Bus. Roundtable, 647 F.3d at 1147.
23 See Joseph W. Yockey, On the Role and Regulation of Private Negotiations in Governance, 61 S.C. L.
REV. 171, 188–89 (2009).
17
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upcoming election.24 For example, as one of the rare successes,25 John D.
Rockefeller won his fight with the management of the Standard Oil Company
of Indiana mainly because of his relatively large ownership stake, his ability to
fund the fight, and his own standing in the community.26
Additionally, shareholders launching a proxy contest have to deal with
various defensive tactics adopted by the board, including the classic antitakeover strategy, “poison pill,” which sometimes creates obstacles for
shareholders to gather enough shares.27 This allows existing shareholders,
excluding the dissenting shareholder who has acquired sufficient shares, to
purchase more discounted shares, and thereby allowing investors to make
instant profits while the shares held by the dissenting shareholder are diluted.28
Apparently, the modern proxy system has created many impediments to
shareholder participation via proxies. In summary, two major legal barriers
impair dissenters’ ability to let their voice be heard effectively: (1) the
indirectness of the shareholder intervention, due to separate filing requirements
independent from a management-initiated proxy;29 and (2) obstacles to owning
a meaningful stake of shares, which leads to the dispersion of the ownership
interest and less incentives for shareholders to act collectively as a group.30
II. RULE-MAKING EFFORT IN PROMOTING SHAREHOLDER INVOLVEMENT
Since the SEC started handling the proxy access issue, numerous
institutional and individual investors have suggested that granting long-term
shareholders a meaningful choice directors is the most important proxy reform
to be considered.31 In response to complaints by shareholders and academics
that the proxy rules impose excessive costs on proxy campaigns, the SEC has

24

Randall S. Thomas, Judicial Review of Defensive Tactics in Proxy Contests: When is Using a Rights
Plan Right, 46 VAND. L. REV. 503, 512 (1993).
25 See Black, supra note 13, at 823 (suggesting that proxy fights are rare and costly).
26 ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY
76–78 (New York, Harcourt, Brace & World, 2d ed. 1968).
27 See Black, supra note 13, at 823 (discussing that current rules make it hard for a single shareholder to
own a large percentage stake in a single company).
28 Poison Pill, INVESTOPEDIA http://www.investopedia.com/terms/p/poisonpill.asp (last visited Apr. 10,
2016). See also Randall S. Thomas, supra note 24.
29 See Bus. Roundtable, 647 F.3d, at 1149.
30 See Black, supra note 13, at 823.
31 Damon A. Silvers & Michael I. Garland, The Origins and Goals of the Fight for Proxy Access, in
SHAREHOLDER ACCESS TO THE CORPORATE BALLOT (Lucian Bebchuk, ed., Harvard University Press)
(forthcoming 2004), https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/dir-nominations/silversgarland022004.pdf.
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made efforts in proposing rule changes that would reduce those costs and
enhance shareholder access.32
Perhaps one of the boldest attempts by the SEC was its changes to Rule
14a-11 in 2010. Based upon the rationale that long-term significant
shareholders should have a means of nominating candidates to the boards of
the companies that they own,33 the SEC adopted the new rules which required
companies to provide shareholders the opportunity to have their nominees
included in the company proxy materials sent to all shareholders.34 Meanwhile,
SEC’s proposed rules also permit shareholders to use shareholder proposals to
amend fundamental corporate documents and to create rules for them to
propose director nominees in proxy materials.35 To have their nominees
included in the proxy materials, shareholders should own at least three percent
of the total voting power of the company’s securities and are entitled to vote on
the election of directors at the annual meeting, though they will be able to
aggregate holdings to meet this threshold.36 They also will be required to have
held their shares for at least three years and will be required to continue to own
at least the required amount of securities until the date of the meeting at which
directors are elected.37
The new rules essentially bridged a shortcut for shareholder involvement in
board elections because shareholders can directly include their nominees at the
beginning of the proxy process and the corporation is required to do so.38 To
some extent, the inclusion of shareholder director nominees has nullified the
exclusionary ground in shareholder proposal rules that the company can use to
exclude the shareholder’s request to put a specific candidate in the proxy
material. However, the new rules cannot fully replace proxy contests from the
perspective of seeking control, due to limits on the number of nominees a

32

See Black, supra note 13, at 829.
SEC Adopts New Measures to Facilitate Director Nominations by Shareholders, supra note 12; see
also Eisenberg, supra note 3, at 1504 (arguing that under the corporate statutes the power to elect the board is
vested exclusively in the shareholders, and to give the incumbent board exclusive access to the corporate proxy
materials for the purpose of designating directorial candidates “would be virtually tantamount to giving [the
board] the power to elect the board [itself]”).
34 SEC Adopts New Measures to Facilitate Director Nominations by Shareholders , supra note 12.
35 Id.
36 Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, 75 Fed. Reg. 56,668, 56,674 (Sept. 16, 2010) (to be
codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-11).
37 Id. at 56,675.
38 SEC Adopts New Measures to Facilitate Director Nominations by Shareholders, supra note 12.
33
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shareholder can include in the proxy material,39 and such shareholder will lose
eligibility if he or she is holding the securities for the purpose of changing
control of the company.40 The rule does not apply if applicable state law or
company’s governing documents “prohibit shareholders from nominating a
candidate for election as a director.”41 It appears that the SEC’s reform of this
particular rule in the Act echoes Black’s proposition of “institutional voice,”
which will allow a certain number of shareholders to collectively have a
significant say in corporate affairs, while limiting the power of any one to act
on its own.42 It is a fair comment that the change did not direct the control
issue, but rather reduced obstacles of shareholder access. Although the rule
imposed a mandatory requirement upon companies instead of offering them a
mere choice, this may be due to the fear that the board’s inaction would render
such choice meaningless in practice.
In spite of the SEC’s intention to mildly improve shareholders’ role in
corporate governance, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit invalidated Rule 14a-11 in less than one year.43 The D.C.
Circuit court struck down the rule primarily because the Commission “acted
arbitrarily and capriciously.”44 The court reasoned that the Commission
neglected and failed to effectively quantify significant costs the company
might incur in order to oppose the shareholder’s candidate.45
Another important factor on the cost side arose from the concern that
institutional investors with special interests, such as state pension funds, would
act in concert and take advantage of the Rule to serve their own interest, rather
than the share value.46 Furthermore, the court agreed with the petitioner’s
contention that the Commission relied upon insufficient empirical data when it
concluded that Rule 14a-11 will improve board performance and increase

39 Id. (stating that the company is not required to include in its proxy materials more than one shareholder
nominee or the number of nominees, if more than one, equal to 25 percent of the number of directors on the
board).
40 Id.
41 Id.
42 Black, supra note 13, at 815–16.
43 Bus. Roundtable, 647 F.3d at 1148.
44 Id.
45 Id. at 1150.
46 See id. at 1152.
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shareholder value by facilitating the election of dissident shareholder
nominees.47
Just as the preceding paragraph has pointed out that Rule 14a-11 cannot
replace the traditional proxy contest in full owing to its limits on shareholders’
votes, the D.C. Circuit court realized that certain traditional proxy contests
would coexist with the mechanism created by the new rules if rules were
adopted, and such co-existence of two separate approaches for a common goal
would improve shareholders’ involvement in board nomination.48 However,
the court found that the SEC’s estimated frequency of nominations under Rule
14a-11 is internally inconsistent, because it “anticipated frequent use of Rule
14a-11 when estimating benefits, but assumed infrequent use when estimating
costs.”49
In general, at least from the surface, this was due to the SEC’s failure to
conduct a more consistent and comprehensive economic analysis and thus, the
court was not persuaded by such proposal. Many academic commentators have
criticized the court’s decision and focused on the improper application of the
standard of review, “arbitrary and capricious,” arguing that the court should
have deferred to the agency’s judgment and the use of empirical analysis.50
Assuming arguendo the court had the means to assess the SEC’s analysis,
scholars are barely convinced by the court’s view of law and economics.51 But
regardless of how the current judicial world views shareholder increasing
democracy, trends and forces in the market change the stereotypical notions
toward the structure of the corporate governance and the function of legal
regime with respect to the proxy mechanism.

47

Id. at 1151. The D.C. Circuit court used one of many counter empirical studies as an example that
“when dissident directors win board seats, those firms underperform peers by 19 to 40% over the two years
following the proxy contest.”
48 Bus. Roundtable, 647 F.3d at 1153.
49 Id. at 1153–54.
50 See Anthony W. Mongone, Note, Business Roundtable: A New Level of Judicial Scrutiny and Its
Implications in a Post-Dodd—Frank World, 2012 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 746, 793 (concluding that the court
used an improperly onerous standard and that it should have upheld the regulation using a more deferential
standard).
51 See Grant M. Hayden & Matthew T. Bodie, The Bizarre Law and Economics of Business Roundtable
v. SEC, 38 J. CORP. L. 101, 120–33 (arguing that the court’s decision in Business Roundtable rests on
economic theory that “departs dramatically from the standard law and economics of corporate law, which
assumes that shareholders and directors will act rationally, that agency costs are a natural byproduct of the
separation of ownership and control, and that the shareholder franchise will increase overall efficiency”).
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III. MODERN MARKET FORCES IN PROMOTING SHAREHOLDER INVOLVEMENT
While the court did not consider the petitioner’s additional argument that
the Commission arbitrarily rejected proposed alternatives that would have
allowed shareholders to decide whether to adopt a proxy access mechanism in
a company,52 such practice has gained much attention in the practical world.
According to the most recent survey conducted by Shearman & Sterling on the
One Hundred Largest US Public companies, there has been a 200% increase
from 2014 to 2015 in shareholder proposals calling for the board to take steps
necessary to amend the company’s governing documents to permit
shareholders satisfying certain ownership criteria to include director nominees
in the company’s proxy materials.53 Many companies adopted or committed to
adopt a proxy access by-law in 2015.54 With such a significant change in
public companies’ attitudes toward shareholder proxy access, one would
wonder what driving force is behind such changes in the absence of rules akin
to 14a-11. This article argues that the capacity and monitoring of both
institutional investors and proxy advisory firms are the major forces that help
form the contemporary use of proxy measures and improve the shareholder
involvement.
A. Institutional Investors’ Role in Corporate Governance and Shareholder
Involvement
With significant share-purchasing capacity, information advantages and
less liquidity in certain long-term investments, financial intermediaries as
institutional investors are the only available candidates capable of effectively
monitoring corporate management.55 In addition to its financial capability, one
of the important aspects of institutional investors’ capacity is that they
normally run highly diversified portfolios of investments and may have their
funds in different corporations.56 Such diversification results in institutional
investors’ interest more in monitoring from a perspective of scale economies
than in company-specific oversight.57

52

Bus. Roundtable, 647 F.3d at 1149.
13th Annual Survey of the 100 Largest US Public Companies, SHEARMAN & STERLING LLP (2015),
http://shearman.uberflip.com/i/581509-2015-corporate-governance-executive-compensation-survey.
54 Id.
55 See Black, supra note 13, at 873–74, 887.
56 OECD, The Role of Institutional Investors in Promoting Good Corporate Governance 12 (2011),
http://www.oecd.org/daf/ca/49081553.pdf.
57 See Black, supra note 13, at 887.
53
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The effect of scale economies offers unparalleled advantages to
institutional investors that individual shareholders cannot acquire.58 Generally
scholars hold positive views toward institutional investors’ activism in
deciding major corporate issues and monitoring firms.59 Even those that are not
convinced of such activism as a value-added factor, remain optimistic toward
institutional investors’ role in promoting good corporate governance, albeit the
means shall be different and more than activism.60
While there have always been heated debates about institutional investors’
functions in promoting corporate governance; in practice, institutional
shareholders have long taken on an active role in influencing corporate matters
with the tool of the proxy process61 and their activism has made other
shareholders more involved and informed in corporate governance. For
example, many institutional shareholders now post their voting decisions and
voting guidelines of proxy process on the internet, prior to the meeting, to offer
individual investors a chance to see where the large investors stand on issues
and the rationales for their decisions.62 More frequent communication among
investors provides dynamics for them to act collectively.63 The inherent
information advantage of large institutions makes such solicitation more
influential,64 which adds more support to collective shareholder actions. A
powerful institutional stockholder may contact management directly to discuss
a specific proposal, suggest modifications to the proposal, or even urge the

58 Id. at 822 (discussing that a shareholder with economies of scale can “reduce her per-company
solicitation cost, while preserving the per-company benefit from success”).
59 See generally Bernard S. Black, The Value of Institutional Investor Monitoring: The Empirical
Evidence, 39 UCLA L. REV. 895 (1992) (discussing that empirical evidence shows that oversight by
institutional investors can add value to the companies in which they own stock).
60 See generally Roberta Romano, Less is More: Making Institutional Investor Activism A Valuable
Mechanism of Corporate Governance, 18 YALE J. ON REG. 174 (2001) (arguing that current practice of
institutional investor activism does not promote the corporate value and suggesting some other measure should
be taken by these investors).
61 See E. Norman Veasey, The Stockholder Franchise Is Not A Myth: A Response to Professor Bebchuk,
93 VA. L. REV. 811, 817 (2007).
62 Jason Van Bergen, Proxy Voting Gives Fund Shareholders A Say, INVESTOPEDIA,
http://www.investopedia.com/articles/basics/04/082704.asp (last visited Apr. 10, 2016).
63 See Lisa M. Fairfax, The Future of Shareholder Democracy, 84 IND. L.J. 1259, 1301 (2009)
(discussing that electronic shareholder forums may facilitate enhanced communication between shareholders
and thus reduce the cost of collective action).
64 See, e.g., Edward S. Adams, Bridging the Gap Between Ownership and Control, 34 J. Corp. L. 409,
432 (2009) (discussing that institutional investors have adequate information on evaluating management).
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board to withdraw the entire proposal.65 With more such ex ante measures,
institutional investors have stronger influence in shareholder proposals.66
Institutional investor activism could impact shareholder involvement in a
more direct way, such as asking for proxy access in shareholder proposals. For
example, New York City Pension Funds used to file proposals at seventy-five
different public companies asking for proxy access for three percent
shareholders who have held their shares for three years.67 While institutional
investors have adequate resources to push their activist proposals to the
forefront, another source of market force could favorably back up
shareholders’ activism, especially when a proposal concerns shareholder
access in general.
B. Influence of Proxy Advisory Firms
Proxy advisory firms provide analysis and voting recommendations on
shareholder voting issues included in proxy statements and institutional
investors hire many of them.68 It is argued that proxy advisory firms are highly
efficient and crucial for the exercise of rational shareholder voting because
they are sophisticated in corporate voting issues, they have the scaled
economics advantage in making voting decisions for a very large variety of
firms and, most importantly, they solve the shareholder’s restriction on
information and free-rider problems.69
The widespread adoption of proxy advisory firms’ opinions allows these
firms to become vital in forming public opinions and summoning shareholders’
decisions.70 Today, any decision by the company regarding proxy matters
could be especially challenging, until the proxy advisory firms publicly

65

Jason Van Bergen, supra note 62.
See Adam J. Sulkowski & Kent Greenfield, A Bridle, a Prod, and a Big Stick: An Evaluation of Class
Actions, Shareholder Proposals, and the Ultra Vires Doctrine as Methods for Controlling Corporate
Behavior, 79 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 929, 938 (2005) (discussing that institutional shareholders can have particular
impact through shareholder proposal due to their influence over corporations’ decision-makers).
67 Courtney Johnson, VII. SEC Rule 14A-8(I)(9) & The Whole Foods Proxy Saga, 34 REV. BANKING &
FIN. L. 458, 460–61 (2015).
68 Sagiv Edelman, Proxy Advisory Firms: A Guide for Regulatory Reform, 62 EMORY L.J. 1369, 1374
(2013).
69 David F. Larcker et al., Outsourcing Shareholder Voting to Proxy Advisory Firms, 58 J.L. & ECON.
173, 174 (2015) (“[P]roxy advisory firms to form and invest in costly data collection and research when this
cost is shared across many institutional investor clients”).
70 See George W. Dent, Jr., A Defense of Proxy Advisors, 2014 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1287, 1292–93 (2014)
(arguing that ‘the proxy firms’ positions essentially mirror the current consensus on good governance”).
66
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announce the factors to be considered in their voting recommendations.71
Many of the firms view shareholder involvement as an important factor to
consider when giving voting advice, and one of the largest advisory firms,
Institutional Shareholder Services (“ISS”), even provides corporate governance
ratings to institutional investors.72 Under proxy advisory firms’ systematic
monitoring and evaluation, corporations would feel pressured to improve their
performance,73 or at least be more open to shareholder involvement.
IV. A PROPOSAL TO LEGAL REFORM ON PROXY ACCESS
With the influence of institutional investor activism and rating and
monitoring from proxy advisory firms, shareholders in big corporations are
more incentivized to include proxy access by-law amendments into
shareholder proposals and the instances are indeed increasing in recent years.74
In contrast to a mandatory requirement upon corporations to include
shareholder nominations in the management proxy material, future law should
just provide shareholders with channels and enable them to exercise their own
choices. However, granting corporations free choice does not mean that the
law should stay totally indifferent in facilitating either, otherwise it makes no
difference to promulgate a new rule. The law should focus on simplifying the
procedure, removing hindrances and empowering shareholders in a more
significant manner than the current legal regime.
The most frequently used approach to create proxy access is shareholder
proposals, as previously discussed in the essay. Shareholders can propose
shareholder proxy access in the proxy materials, so future shareholders can
include their nominees into proxy materials, which in effect is a corporatelevel promulgation of Rule 14a-11.75 But Rule 14a-8(i)(9) permits a company,
upon submitting a “no-action” letter to the SEC, to exclude a shareholder
proposal that directly conflicts with a management proposal on the same

71 Andrew J. Brady & Lucas F. Torres, SEC Staff Will No Longer Issue No-Action Letters on Conflicting
Shareholder Proposals During the 2015 Proxy Season, AKIN GUMP (Jan. 28, 2015),
https://www.akingump.com/en/experience/practices/corporate/ag-deal-diary/sec-staff-will-no-longer-issue-noaction-letters-on-conflicting.html.
72 Edelman, supra note 68, at 1384.
73 See, e.g., id. at 1385–86 (discussing that proxy advisory firms wield great influence over corporations
and institutional investors).
74 13th Annual Survey of the 100 Largest US Public Companies, supra note 53.
75 See SEC Adopts New Measures to Facilitate Director Nominations by Shareholders, supra note 12.
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topic.76 The SEC does not usually overturn no-action letters.77 Although
shareholders may resort to litigation to compel inclusion of its proposal in the
company’s proxy materials, this approach may be costly and timeconsuming.78
Therefore, one optimal method to balance between shareholders and
directors is to grant mandatory inclusion of proxy access proposals, if certain
thresholds are met. Such thresholds can be the amount of shares making the
proposal (for instance, six percent of the voting shares) and the minimum
holding period (for instance, three years) to avoid frivolous proposals, and to
allow shareholders to aggregate their shares.79 Once sufficient eligible shares
are gathered, the shareholder group may file a request to the SEC, prior to the
directors’ filing of a proxy statement and ask for mandatory inclusion. Upon
preliminary review of the proposal, the SEC should then grant the inclusion.
The company may object regarding the inclusion to either SEC or to the court
and it cannot rely on the ground of conflicts with the company’s proposal,80
but instead it should provide more substantive reasons.
It is not hard to imagine, under this set of rules, after the proposal is
included in the proxy materials and the proposal moves to the voting round,
under the influence of pro-shareholder proxy advisory firms, that an adequate
number of shareholders might vote for the proposal. Such a rule does not
significantly undermine the corporate autonomy but merely tilts the balance a
bit more toward the shareholder side than before.
CONCLUSION
Although the failure of the SEC’s proposal of 14a-11 disappointed many
practitioners and scholars,81 the institutional investors and proxy advisory
firms have been pushing companies, especially large companies, to pay
attention to shareholder involvement as a key standard of evaluating their
76 17 C.F.R. §240.14a-8 (2010); Mary Jo White, Statement from Chair White Directing Staff to Review
Commission Rule for Excluding Conflicting Proxy Proposals, SEC.GOV (Jan. 16, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/
news/statement/statement-on-conflicting-proxy-proposals.html.
77 See Andrew Ackerman & Joann S. Lublin, SEC Reverses Decision on Shareholder Proposal—Update,
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businesses.82 Considering the current market incentives for more demands in
shareholder involvement, the prospective legal reform of proxy rules should
utilize such trends and play the role of supplementer and facilitator, by
removing certain procedural hurdles in proxy access. Such reform can
effectively promote meaningful shareholder involvement, especially in director
election, and in the meantime avoid the risk of being repealed by judicial
review.
ZHIYUAN LIU*
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